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Among the explanations for state ratification of human rights treaties, few are more 
common and widely accepted than the conjecture that states are rewarded for ratification 
by other states. These rewards are expected to come in the form of tangible benefits – 
foreign aid, trade, and investment – and intangible benefits such as praise, acceptance, 
and legitimacy. Surprisingly, these explanations for ratification have never been tested 
empirically. We summarize and clarify the theoretical underpinnings of “reward-for-
ratification” theories and test these propositions empirically by looking for increased 
international aid, economic agreements and public praise and recognition following 
ratification of four prominent human rights treaties. We find almost no evidence that 
states can expect increased tangible or intangible rewards after ratification. Given the 
lack of empirical support, alternative explanations seem more appealing for 
understanding human rights treaty ratification. 
                    
                                                 
1 Authors’ notes: We appreciate financial support for research assistance from the Institute for Quantitative Social 
Science at Harvard University. John Sheffield provided excellent research assistance. We appreciate comments from 
Resat Bayer, Tanya Boerzel, Allison Brysk, Andy Eggers, Andreas Føllesdal, Ryan Goodman, Darren Hawkins, Iain 
Johnston, Thomas Risse, Anne Julie Semb, Geir Ulfstein, Jane Vaynman, and Erik Voeten. Beth Simmons wishes to 
acknowledge that her work on this article was written as part of the international research program on 'Should States 
Ratify Human Rights Conventions?' at the Centre for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and 
Letters in Oslo during the academic year 2009/2010. Richard Nielsen acknowledges support from a National 
Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship from 2009-2012. A replication archive is available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/24301. 2 
 
The “accountability revolution” in human rights has been one of the most significant trends in 
international law and international affairs in the past half-century (Clark 2001:3-5, Ignatieff 2001:5-7). 
More than 45 human rights treaties concluded since the Second World War now effectively recognize the 
legitimacy  of  external  actors’  concerns  about  domestic  rights  practices  (Simmons  2009).  But  this 
apparent concession of sovereignty by states is puzzling.  Unlike other issue areas where the mutual 
benefits  of  cooperation  create  incentives  for  reciprocal  respect  of  international  treaties,  states  have 
relatively  little  to  gain  from  regulation  of  human  rights  abroad  and  potentially  much  to  lose  from 
international interference in their own domestic practices. 
Why should sovereign states agree to subject an internal issue to international scrutiny? How can 
we understand the apparently voluntary decision to ratify international  human rights agreements that 
create legal obligations to protect and provide for the human rights of one’s nationals? Scholars have 
proposed three kinds of answers. The first downplays the significance of the international human rights 
regime because it is largely unenforceable (Krasner 1999:105-125). A second approach acknowledges 
that  international  treaty  commitments  are  potentially  costly  because  they  may  create  pressures  for 
adjustments in policies and practices. This approach attributes ratification to the desire to attract some 
kind of material reward as a matter of implicit or even explicit quid pro quo. A final approach sees 
ratification  as  driven  by  intangible  benefits:  belonging,  praise,  acceptance,  respect,  or  inclusion. 
Governments ratify human rights agreements, in this last view, because ratification ushers a state into the 
circles of the most respected countries in the world. 
None  of  these  explanations  has  undergone  serious  empirical  scrutiny,  and  yet  they  appear 
repeatedly  in  the  literature.  This  article  explores  the  evidence  for  and  against  the  “rewards-for-
ratification” hypothesis by testing whether states actually receive purported rewards; if they do not, then it 
undermines claims that the anticipation of rewards drives ratification. Of course, we cannot observe the 
privately held expectations of state leaders. But we argue that if rewards consistently motivate states to 
ratify, then they should, on average, receive observable ones. Otherwise, governments would update their 
expectations about the advantages that ratification brings. If we observe tangible or intangible payoffs to 3 
 
ratification, then there is a strong prima facie case that reward-seeking is a motivation for ratification. In 
fact, we find almost no evidence that such rewards exist. These negative results strongly recommend in 
favor of alternative explanations for commitment to international human rights standards. 
This article proceeds as follows. We first review prevalent theoretical approaches to analyzing the 
puzzle of human rights treaty ratification. The second section discusses what observable implications 
follow from “rewards-for-ratification” theories. The third section discusses the data and methods, and the 
fourth  section  presents  the  results.  In  the  conclusion  we  suggest  alternative  ways  to  think  about 
ratification decisions. However, our main contribution is our careful demonstration that shockingly little 
empirical support exists for rewards-for-ratification theories. Thus, our largely null results significantly 
undermine common assertions found in the international-law and human rights literature.  
 
I. Human Rights and International Relations: The Ratification Puzzle 
There are many ways to think about the influences on governments’ commitments to international 
human rights treaties. One approach views treaty commitment as a low-cost opportunity to express 
support for a cooperative international endeavor. Hathaway (2002:2013,2019) proposes that governments 
ratify treaties as a costless expression of support for the principles contained in them. Those who ratify 
reap “rewards for positions rather than for effects.” Because human rights agreements are not effectively 
monitored, “the expressive benefits that countries gain from the act of joining the treaty will be 
enjoyed…regardless of whether they actually comply with the treaty’s requirements.” In this view, 
international legal arrangements are weak and rarely enforced so states face low costs from 
noncompliance. Why not ratify, then, and gain some support—or at least praise—from the international 
community for doing so? In fact, proponents of this line of argument claim that two kinds of benefits 
follow from ratification: tangible economic benefits and intangible social “legitimation.” We term this 
line of argument “rewards theory.” 
 4 
 
Tangible rewards 
In some accounts, the rewards governments expect when they commit themselves to international 
human rights standards are blatantly mercenary. Hathaway (2004) describes ratification as motivated by 
the desire for material quid pro quos:  
Simply put, states join treaties like the Convention against Torture [CAT] in no small part 
to make themselves look good. In so doing, they may hope to attract more foreign 
investment, aid donations, international trade, and other tangible benefits
 (Hathaway 
2004:207). 
 
Economic benefits are among the “collateral [non-legal] consequences” of human rights treaty 
ratification, according to Hathaway (2007:595). 
Similar propositions abound in the literature. Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006:361) note that norms 
supporting ratification of the Convention Against Torture  may spread through a “logic of consequences” 
in which “other states and third party actors (corporations and NGOs) reward that state through 
investment, trade, aid and positive political relationships.” Boockman asserts that international aid could 
influence the decision to ratify International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions (Boockmann 2001). 
Posner (2008:1769) lists “pressure from western states that tied aid and other benefits (such as EU 
membership) to treaty ratification” as the first reason developing states ratify human rights treaties. And 
Trachtman (2012:886) finds other explanations for treaty ratification “less plausible” than a quid pro quo 
logic of rewards. Moreover, despite recognition that the multilateral aid organizations such as the World 
Bank do not explicitly link their assistance to human rights treaty ratification, the idea persists in the 
literature that “International organizations also encourage ratification by linking a treaty with material 
goals, such as economic aid” (Oberdörster 2008:705). 
Many dispute the idea that human rights policies are enforced by the manipulation of rewards and 
punishments. Realists assert that governments are generally unwilling to expend significant resources to 
influence foreign human rights practices (Goldsmith and Posner 2000:668). But even if states are inclined 
to enforce foreign citizens’ rights, it does not follow that they would focus their efforts on securing the 
ratification of treaties. Some international legal theorists claim that ratification provides a critical signal of 5 
 
intent. Guzman, for example, argues—albeit not specifically in the context of human rights—that treaties 
involve “the complete pledge of a nation's reputational capital” (Guzman 2002:1880) and therefore 
constitute a credible commitment on the part of states to comply with their provisions. But in the absence 
of reciprocity—notably lacking in the human rights area—it may be difficult for an essentially 
unenforceable pledge to put much at stake because there is possibility of tit-for-tat retaliation to motivate 
compliance. The puzzle deepens if we buy the common observation that treaties do little to persuade the 
worst rights offenders to improve their policies (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Hollyer and Rosendorff 
2011). 
Perhaps the type of agreements that states choose to ratify makes some commitments credible 
without enforcement or reciprocity. Smith-Cannoy argues that during especially hard economic times, 
states consciously join enforceable human rights agreements, such as the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—which gives individuals the right to 
complain of a treaty violation to the Human Rights Committee—and an Article 22 Declaration regarding 
the CAT—which provides individuals similar standing before the Committee Against Torture (Smith-
Cannoy 2012). She argues that ratification of enforceable agreements is an opportunity for states to 
collect aid from donors that may care about human rights.  
We do not doubt that some countries and organizations use economic leverage to encourage states 
to improve their human rights behavior and to encourage the consolidation of democratic institutions. The 
European Union and NATO may sometimes employ various forms of conditionality in this way 
(Sanahuja 2000; Hawkins 2004; Kelley 2004). However, careful studies of the use of the European 
Union’s “conditionality clause” reveal not a single instance of its invocation as a result of a state’s refusal 
to ratify a human rights treaty (Moberg 2009). Furthermore, while there may be very good theoretical 
reasons to believe that the actual protection of rights in domestic law and practice constitutes a costly 
signal of governments’ intentions (Farber 2002), it does not follow that states or commercial actors 
reward ratification for its own sake. Indeed, aid donors typically monitor their recipients. They sometimes 
reward actual policy changes on human rights (Alston and Crawford 2000:204-205; Nielsen 2013). But 6 
 
little evidence suggests that they alter their behavior in response to treaty ratification. For example, in 
1975, the US Congress passed legislation prohibiting the extension of foreign economic assistance to 
countries with severe human rights violations. However, instead of relying on the “signal” sent by treaty 
ratification, Congress commissioned detailed human rights reports for each potential aid recipient. This 
suggests that donors find it worth their while to collect information on actual human rights practices 
when they make their aid decisions. 
 In short, the current literature largely assumes—on wobbly theoretical grounds and without 
empirical support—that governments ratify human rights agreements because they expect some kind of 
material rewards, whether official aid, liberalized trade, or private investment. This literature remains 
generally silent about when such rewards are doled out. Are such rewards an inducement or capacity-
building effort prior to ratification, as the “management school” of compliance might suggest (Chayes 
and Chayes 1993)? Are they post hoc rewards for having ratified a key treaty? Rewards theorists say even 
less about who is responsible for making decisions about tangible rewards; indeed, they pay practically no 
attention to the varying motives of governments, principled NGOs, and profit-seeking private actors—or 
how these actors may work in tandem or at cross purposes. Still, the assumption that the desire for 
tangible rewards drives ratification is so pervasive that it merits close empirical scrutiny, if for no other 
reason than to encourage social scientists to develop better explanations for the spread of legal 
agreements on  human rights over the past five decades.  
 
Intangible Rewards 
A second set of explanations for human rights treaty ratification stresses the importance 
governments attach to the approval of the international community. States ratify treaties, in this view, out 
of  a desire to “belong” as a “member in good standing” to the international community of “modern” 
nations.  
Sociological theories tend to emphasize the collective legitimating function of international legal 
agreements, especially in the human rights area.  According to a classic study on international human 7 
 
rights norms, “International law and international organizations are still the primary vehicles for stating 
community norms and for collective legitimation” (Risse and Sikkink 1999:8). Governments are 
“socialized” to care about what other states think of them (Lutz and Sikkink 2000). International law 
plays a central role in this process. Landman (2005:13) refers to the ratification of human rights treaties as 
a “socially embedded unit act,” that has meaning largely because of the value assigned to it by the 
international community of nations. The value that the international community places on these 
agreements generates, in turn, subtle pressures for ratification. 
Some scholars believe that participating in the social act of treaty ratification imparts a degree of 
legitimacy to the government taking that action. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui for example note the “strong 
pressures to ratify international human rights treaties” and assert that “ratification puts a legitimate face 
on the government” (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005:1402). This need for legitimacy, coupled with 
awareness that commitment to the regime seldom incurs costs, putatively explains the lack of a 
relationship between treaty ratification and the actual protection of human rights. Landman (2005:92) 
similarly refers to the need of new “fourth wave” democracies to garner international legitimacy, and cites 
this need as a reason for human rights treaty ratification. 
A related argument stresses the desire of states to avoid public criticism. This desire stems from 
both instrumental and identity-based factors. Hawkins (2004:793) explains states’ shifting positions on 
the universal jurisdiction provisions of the CAT as a reflection of efforts to “avoid positions in which they 
would stand alone against other states, especially those with similar identities.” Simmons (2009) suggests 
that the desire to avoid criticism may motivate some “insincere” states to ratify human rights agreements, 
but also argues that this strategy makes sense only in the short run and only when relatively little 
information is available on their actual practices. States sometimes also respond to naming and shaming 
by attempting to neutralize its effectiveness. Engleheart (2003:44) identifies the 1993 Bangkok 
Declaration as an exercise of international solidarity representing a “serious attempt to shift international 
human rights norms, in order to weaken the strategy of shaming.” From a constructivist perspective, the 8 
 
threat of shaming can present a real cost to states that seek acceptance by international society. The 
possibility of praise, on the other hand, amounts to an important benefit for such states.  
Sociologists have applied the concept of “World Culture” to capture the idea that values, norms, 
and ideas of what constitutes proper behavior of a modern state diffuse (in varying degrees) throughout 
the world. In a global macrosociological context, treaty ratification is part of this process of diffusion in 
which governments seek to present themselves to the broader international community, and to their own 
citizens, as actors that affirm the basic rights of individuals. This line of argument treats ratification as an 
act of emulation, in which states “enact” the values of a broader western progressive culture, in an effort 
formally to identify themselves as members in “good standing” of the modern society of states (Meyer, 
Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997). In the case of human rights treaty ratification these standards of good 
standing are transmitted via international conferences, organizations, and peer-group ratification 
(Berkovitch 1999; Boli and Thomas 1999). Treaty ratification is thus one way to enact the “script” of 
modernity (Wotipka and Ramirez 2008:304). It becomes, more likely when a nation-state is embedded in 
the structures of international society. But to the extent that ratification is mere enactment of these 
external scripts, it represents nothing more than “isomorphism”—states adopt superficially similar formal 
policies without actually internalizing their substance.  
While these ideational mechanisms differ from one another—shaming and persuasion imply 
active policies on the part of pro-rights agents, while theories that point to the mere availability of modern 
scripts treat core states as playing a much more passive role—they all suggest the existence of intangible 
external pressures for treaty ratification. Moreover, they all suffer from questionable logic. Social 
approval might be a plausible explanation for ratification if no one pays attention to subsequent behavior. 
In fact, citizens, other governments, and assorted transnational advocacy groups value actual human-
rights practices and enjoy reasonably good information about them. It strikes us as self-contradictory to 
claim that “Repressive states want the legitimacy that the human rights treaties confer on them more than 
non-repressive states because they are under tighter scrutiny for their practices” (Hafner-Burton,Tsutsui, 9 
 
and Meyer 2008:122). After all, how can treaty ratification alone grant “legitimacy” if observers are 
scrutinizing state behavior (Goodman and Jinks 2003:176-180)? 
 
II. Testing the Claims of Rewards Theory 
Rewards theory posits that states ratify human rights treaties in anticipation of external incentives. 
Tangible benefits may include foreign aid, trade or investment agreements, on the assumption that 
economic treaties will ultimately encourage greater trade and investment. Bilateral foreign aid – the most 
easily manipulated form of reward-for-ratification – should increase after ratification or slightly prior to 
it—if it is being offered by foreign governments as an inducement to ratify. States may also manipulate 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to encourage treaty 
ratification—although entrenched political interests may resist more than in the case of aid. Our tests 
employ a range of lag structures to take these varying dynamics into account.   
We initially assume rewards-for-ratification deals are extended most readily by states who 
themselves have ratified the treaty in question. In practice this assumption is not too constraining since 
every member of the OECD—which itself represents the world largest markets and biggest aid donors— 
has ratified the CAT and the ICCPR, all but six have ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,
2 and 
exactly half have also acceded to Article 22. We can think of no persuasive reason for a non-party state to 
attempt to incentivize other states to ratify. The one important exception might be the United States, 
which has committed to neither the ICCPR’s first optional protocol, nor to the CAT’s Article 22. But this 
seems unlikely. As we show below, the United States does not even extend praise to states that so 
commit. Thus, the assumption that those who reward are themselves likely to be ratifiers seems justified. 
If ratifiers do not incentivize others to join their ranks, it is not clear who else would.
3 
                                                 
2 Israel, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
3 One possible exception is the CAT’s Article 22, which potentially offers a small “positive externality” for states 
other than the ratifier.  Its language implies that an individual from Country X could appeal to the Committee 
against Torture if tortured in Country Y, even if Y has committed to Article 22 but X has not. However, we know of 
no such case and expect such instances would be far too rare to matter to the analysis. Moreover, in at least one 10 
 
Our second (and more challenging) empirical task is to test the claim that governments ratify 
human rights treaties for intangible rewards, such as external acceptance, approval, and a sense of 
legitimacy. Essentially, this is a claim about the psychological boost a set of policymakers experience 
when they feel they have done something to please external actors whose approval they seek. Because 
this kind of reward involves the subjective experiences of individuals, we cannot directly evaluate it with 
the methods used in this article. But we can provide a systematic empirical test of the proposition that 
governments ratify human rights agreements in order to gain external approval or praise—outcomes 
constituting “expressive benefits” in Hathaway’s words (2002:2004), or social “coercion” in Goodman 
and Jinks’ formulation (2005).  
If external approval amounts to an important motivation for ratification, then it should be possible 
to connect ratification with some form of public praise from important global actors: for example, the 
European Union, the United States, and the most visible nonstate human-rights organization, Amnesty 
International. One might also expect to see more frequent and positive public references when the treaty 
in question constitutes a credible commitment; that is, when it is non-derogable and, to some degree, 
enforceable. 
 
III. Data and Methods 
Measuring Treaty Ratification 
The empirical analysis focuses on the easiest cases for rewards theory: the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the First Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (OP 1), the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and the optional 
22
nd Article of the Convention Against Torture (Art. 22).
4  These are four agreements form the core of the 
multilateral legal apparatus protecting personal integrity, civil, and political rights. If ratifying these 
                                                                                                                                                             
likely Country X, the United States, victims of foreign torture have access to the Torture Victim Protection Act of 
1991, which provide remedies through US courts, making CAT Article 22 moot. 
4 All texts are at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ (Accessed 1 January 2013). 11 
 
treaties garners no rewards, then the same should be the case for others—such as the largely hortatory 
Convention on the Rights of the Child or the Disabilities Convention. The ICCPR and CAT lack 
enforcement but ICCPR Optional Protocol 1 and CAT Article 22 tie a state to external oversight by 
allowing individuals from ratifying states to report abuses directly to oversight committees. Presumably, 
this creates a higher probability that violations will be noticed, condemned, and sanctioned. One might 
expect the “going price” for ratifying these agreements therefore to be higher.
5  
We use ratification episodes – the window of time surrounding treaty ratification – as our unit of 
analysis.  As we argued above, existing theory is vague about the timing of putative rewards, so we 
define the ratification episode as the eleven years surrounding ratification, with five years of prior data 
for statistical control, and six years of data during and after ratification in which we look for rewards. We 
compare these ratification episodes to identically sized historical periods from countries that have not 
(yet) ratified a particular human rights treaty. For example, Bolivia did not ratify the CAT between 1985 
and 1995, making Bolivia-1990 (the focal year is 1990) an episode of non-ratification that we can 
compare to episodes of ratification. Non-ratification episodes may overlap—Bolivia also did not ratify 
the CAT between 1986 and 1996 ,which we treat as another non-ratification episode. We account for the 
non-independence of these overlapping non-ratification episodes in our statistical models by using 
country-level random effects and clustered errors. Multiple non-ratification episodes may come from the 
earlier history of countries that eventually ratify a treaty—Bolivia eventually ratified the CAT in 1998—
abut we do not allow ratification episodes and non-ratification episodes to overlap (ratification episodes 
take priority). 
Because episodes of treaty ratification are likely to be different from many of the episodes of 
non-ratification, we face a potential problem of selection bias. For example, we find that in the five years 
prior to ratification of the CAT, states had higher GDP, higher trade flows, more political freedoms, and 
lower aid flows than states that did not subsequently ratify. We address these imbalances by first pre-
                                                 
5 Although Article 22 and Optional Protocol 1 are only open to states that have already ratified the CAT or ICCPR 
respectively, we examine them separately and expect that they may have different rewards due to variance in the 
credibility of commitments.  12 
 
processing the data using matching to identify a matched sub-sample in which the ratification- and non-
ratification episodes are comparable (Ho, Imai, King and Stuart 2007).
6 We then use standard regression 
techniques to compare similar ratification and non-ratification episodes, controlling for the observed 
differences in the relevant control variables in each of the five year periods prior to ratification or non-
ratification.
7 Because we have repeated episodes of non-ratification from the same countries, we use a 
hierarchical model with country-level random effects and clustered standard errors to account for 
similarities that are constant within countries across time. Throughout, we control for actual human rights 
practices using Physical integrity violations and Political rights, both from Cingranelli and Richards 
(2010). This tests the proposition that ratification alone – and not actual human rights practices – elicits 
rewards from the international community.  
If treaty ratification is a statistically significant and substantively important predictor of rewards 
in the five years following, we conclude that the hypothesis is supported. Our primary contention is that 
there is no evidence for rewards, but failure to reject the null hypothesis is not the same as evidence for 
the null hypothesis (Casella and Berger 2001). Demonstrating evidence against rewards requires a 
slightly different inferential strategy in which we first select a magnitude of effect (that we denote m) that 
would be considered meaningfully significant and then conduct a hypothesis test where the rejection 
region lies between –m and m. Conveniently, this procedure is simple within a regression framework – it 
is equivalent to showing that m falls outside of a standard 90 percent confidence interval constructed 
around the estimated coefficient (Rainey 2014). 
 
Measuring Tangible Rewards 
                                                 
6 We match using Mahalanobis distance based on the one year (t-1) lags of pre-ratification covariates. We retain all 
treated units (to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated) and match each to the nearest control unit 
(matching is 1-to-1). The matching is greedy so that each control episode is used only once.  
7 The results are similar when we use regression without matching. We believe the matching results to be more 
credible because they rely less on un-testable modeling assumptions (see for example Simmons and Hopkins 2005). 13 
 
We measure tangible rewards of three types: foreign aid flows, ratification of preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs), and signing of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). These are the manifestations of 
aid, trade, and FDI that are most under government control and thus most plausibly deployed as rewards.  
We combine data from Nielsen (2013) with extended foreign aid data from Tierney et al. (2011) 
to create a dyadic data set of per capita bilateral aid flows from Western donors to 120 developing 
countries between 1986 and 2010 . In the tests shown below, we specifically look at aid from donors that 
have already ratified the treaty in question, but other models with from all donors produce similar 
results. Following Nielsen (2013), we control for measures of recipient need, donors’ strategic interests, 
Cold War dynamics and bureaucratic inertia. To test whether states reward ratifiers with PTAs, we use 
logistic regression to estimate whether ratification increases the probability that the ratifying country will 
sign a preferential trade agreement (PTA) with a partner in the next six years. As with aid, our primary 
specifications include only partners that have already ratified the relevant treaty because we believe these 
are most likely to reward ratification. We use a data set of dyadic PTA signings from Mansfield and 
Milner (2012) along with the controls included in their preferred model. We test for investment 
agreement rewards using a dyadic data set of bilateral investment treaties, originally analyzed by Elkins, 
Guzman and Simmons (2006). We use logistic regression to estimate the probability that a dyad ratifies a 
bilateral investment treaty in the subsequent 6 years. Full lists of control variables for each of these 
models are available in Tables 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
 
Measuring Intangible Rewards 
We measure incidents of praise and criticism using newly collected and previously existing text 
resources representing the views of the European Union, the United States, and Amnesty International. 
We collected 34,335 European Union press releases – more than three a day on average – published 
between 1985 and 2010 on the full range of political topics engaged by the European Union. If praise 
occurs, we expect it to be evident in these press releases, since the European Union has led the way in the 
international human rights regime, and arguably has significant economic and political might in this area. 14 
 
We also obtained 3,625 US State Department Daily Press Briefings between January 2, 1991 and 
December 23, 2008; these briefings are the primary way in which the State Department provides public 
information.  They are written by staff of the Department of State, delivered to an audience of journalists, 
and followed by recorded questions and answers.
8 
Because praise is more immediate and short-lived than aid or trade agreements, we shortened the 
ratification episode time frame to 365 days prior to and the 365 following the exact ratification date. To 
measure praise in EU press releases and US press briefings, we first identify each episode of ratification 
and then examine (1) the existence of explicit praise, (2) positive versus negative language and (3) 
reference to official state visits.  
Finally, we use data on criticism by Amnesty International collected by Ron, Ramos, and 
Rodgers (2005) to test whether ratification of human rights treaties mutes criticism by nonstate actors. 
Amnesty International ultimately focuses on acts of torture, but regularly cites international agreements 
when criticizing governments.
9 We estimate models predicting the number of critical reports about a 
particular country released in a given year, using a set of variables collected and used by Ron et al., 
supplemented with our ratification variable. 
 
IV. Findings 
Tangible Rewards 
  Overall, our findings offer relatively little evidence that tangible rewards accrue to ratifying 
states. In Table 1, we report the coefficients on the key variable of interest: ratification of the four key 
human rights treaties.
10 The estimated gains in aid from ratifying the ICCPR, its Optional Protocol 1, the 
CAT, and Article 22 are generally small and in all cases statistically indistinguishable from zero. This 
                                                 
8 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/ (Accessed 10 January 2012) 
9 See for example http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/qatar-must-not-return-ex-diplomat-to-saudi-arabia-
amid-torture-fears (Accessed 11 January 2013). 
10 We omit the coefficients for control variables because they are generally not amenable to causal interpretation, 
especially after our matching procedure. Full results are available in the online appendix.
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failure to reject the null is consistent across many alternative specifications. With only a handful of 
exceptions, we were unable to coerce a stronger result by logging the outcome variable, using a Tobit 
specification, using only the one-year lags of the control variables, using alternative windows for rewards, 
looking at aid from all donors (not just those that have ratified the same agreement), and omitting the 
matching. Of the 448 alternative models we considered, only 16 would have offered support for any type 
of aid rewards and there is no indication that a particular type of specification would give positive results 
(see the supplemental information).    
   
Outcome Variable  Foreign Aid/capita 
    Model 1     Model 2    Model 3    Model 4 
Treaty    ICCPR      OP 1      CAT     Art. 22 
Effect of Ratification 
(Clustered standard error) 
[90% confidence interval] 
    1.25 
   (0.90) 
[-0.23, 2.74] 
     1.13 
    (0.86) 
 [-0.28, 2.54] 
    1.25 
   (0.82) 
[-0.11, 2.60] 
    -0.66 
    (0.79) 
[-1.95, 0.63] 
         
N treated dyads     595     453    923     418 
N non-treated dyads     595     453    923     418 
Years  1986-2010  1986-2010  1986-2010  1986-2010 
R-squared      0.56       0.84      0.55       0.46 
Matching    Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes 
Controls   Physical integrity rights
†, lagged aid/capita
†, global aid flows, GDP p.c.
†,  
population
†, dyadic trade
†, colonial relationships, alliances with aid 
donors, an indicator for the Cold War, an indicator for formerly socialist 
states, an indicator for ongoing war
†, and regional indicators. All 
variables are lagged one year. Variables indicated with 
† include the lags 
t-2, t-3, t-4, and t-5 as well. 
TABLE 1: Linear regression of aid flows per capita on treaty ratification with dyad random effects. The 
unit of observation is the (non-)ratification episode dyad, with ratification occurring in year t, all 
covariates measured in t-1, and most time-varying covariates measured in the years t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4, and t-
5. The outcome variable is total receipts of foreign aid per capita in years t through t+5. The sample is 
limited to dyads in which the donor has ratified the relevant treaty. 
 
How confident can we be that ratification provides no significant aid benefits? It depends on how 
we define “significant.” As a first cut, we decided that a minimally meaningful reward m might be at least 16 
 
$2 per capita over six years (a mere 33 cents per year).
11 With this as our value of m, we find evidence of 
no effect for Article 22, but insignificant results for the ICCPR, Optional Protocol 1, and the CAT. Of 
course, the choice of m is ultimately subjective so readers may reach different conclusions; for example, if 
m were greater than $2.74, then we would reject the hypothesis of aid rewards for all treaties. The key 
finding remains: there is no appreciable evidence for aid rewards.  
These findings on the weak relationship between ratification and official aid comport with 
qualitative interview evidence. We interviewed a selection of officials whom we thought would be most 
likely to offer tangible rewards to states that ratified human rights treaties. Norway, for example, has 
ratified more human rights treaties than any other country in the world, and is famously generous with 
foreign aid (which totals about 1% of its gross national income).
12 However, when asked specifically 
whether treaty ratification influences their aid decisions, relevant Norwegian officials at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs denied that aid policies had any linkages with a country’s status as a party to any human 
rights treaties.
13 They described development aid as being on a “different track.” They often, of course, 
discussed human rights with officials from recipient states, but never suggested that aid was conditioned 
on treaty ratification.  
Similarly, Germany has ratified most human rights agreements, and devotes more than a third of 
a per cent of its national income to foreign aid. However, an official from the German Foreign Ministry 
who headed the Human Rights Department from 2003 to 2008 indicated that while German policy did 
emphasize human rights, there was no aid conditionality relating to ratification of treaties.  He noted that 
“ratification of hr [human rights] treaties is one thing, the strict (or even not so strict) observance of the 
respective treaties' provisions is a completely different one…” Furthermore, “coercion and clear 
pressure—at least with the means at our disposal—generally doesn't have the desired effect in the country 
                                                 
11 Average aid per capita over six years has a highly skewed distribution with many zeros, a mean of 
$7.40, and a maximum of $120.  
12 See OECD table at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-norway_20752288-table-
nor (Accessed 11 January 2013) 
13  Interviews at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 6 August 2009. Officials interviewed: Anne Marchant, 
Ambassador, Human Rights Issues, Section for Human Rights and Democracy, and Geir Løkken, Assistant Director 
General, Minister of International Development’s Policy Analysis Unit. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway. 17 
 
at hand but rather satisfies our own public's needs' (including those of NGOs).”
14 For these reasons, 
Germany urges ratification but does not link aid to ratification. In two of the most likely donor cases, 
knowledgeable practitioners reject the aid-for-ratification story. 
  Rewards theory is slightly more difficult to reject for economic agreements. Table 2 shows the 
results of four models predicting conclusion of preferential trade agreements between dyads where one 
member has ratified the relevant human rights agreement. As these are the only positive results of the 
paper, it is worth interpreting them substantively. We find that ratifying the ICCPR and Article 22 
increases the probability of signing a PTA in the 6 years following their ratification by 2.5 percentage 
points and 2.6 percentage points respectively. These results are relatively robust to alternative 
specifications – the ICCPR result is robust in the vast majority of specifications and the Article 22 result 
persists in many, but not all.  We do not find similar evidence of rewards for Optional Protocol 1 and the 
CAT, and these null results are generally robust. To further evaluate these rewards, we collected trade 
data from approximately the same time period (Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007) and estimated whether 
ratification led to detectable differences in actual trade flows. We found that it did not, leading us to 
wonder how meaningful a 2.5 percentage point marginal increase in PTA formation is to the leaders of a 
country seeking rewards for ratification.  
To test whether we can confidently claim that ratifying Optional Protocol 1 and the CAT have no 
effect, we decide a priori that the probability of a PTA must increase by at least one percentage point in 
the six years following ratification. Stipulating this threshold, we are able to reject the possibility of 
rewards in the case of the CAT but not for the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol 1. 
Turning to investment agreements, we find no evidence that ratification of human rights 
agreements increases the probability of a bilateral investment treaty in a dyad. Ratification is a 
statistically insignificant predictor of BIT ratification in two of the models we estimate and negative in the 
others. These negative findings are surprising as we have no theoretical prediction that states would 
                                                 
14 Interview with Peter Rothen, Head of the German Foreign Office’s Human Rights Department 2003-2008; via e-
mail correspondence; 11 August 2009.  18 
 
punish ratification. States only experience a 2.9 percentage point decrease in the chance of signing a BIT 
following ratification of the ICCPR which is probably a negligible effect. However, the decrease 
following ratification of Optional Protocol 1 is not as negligible; a BIT with a current signatory is 8.7 
percentage points less likely. We do not believe that this effect is general – we find no evidence of 
negative effects elsewhere – but this presents a puzzle that may deserve further investigation. 
 
Outcome Variable  Preferential Trade Agreements between Dyads 
    Model 5     Model 6    Model 7    Model 8 
Treaty    ICCPR      OP 1      CAT     Art. 22 
Effect of Ratification 
(Clustered standard error) 
[90% confidence interval] 
    0.44*
 
   (0.11) 
[0.25, 0.63] 
     0.07 
    (0.13) 
[-0.13, 0.28] 
     0.10  
    (0.12) 
[-0.09, 0.28] 
     0.56* 
    (0.18) 
[0.25, 0.87] 
         
N treated dyads   4,359   2,543   4,382    882 
N control dyads   4,359   2,543   4,382    882 
Years  1982-2007  1982-2007  1986-2007  1986-2007 
Matching    Yes     Yes    Yes     Yes 
Controls   Physical integrity rights, Regime type
†, veto players, existing PTA
†, GDP 
(logged)
†, ∆GDP (in $100 billion)
†, Dispute (PRIO)
†, Alliance (ATOP), 
former colony, contiguity, Distance (logged), Hegemony, Post-Cold War, 
GDP ratio
†, and % Dyads ratifying PTA, GATT/WTO. All variables are 
lagged one year. Variables indicated with 
† include the lags t-2, t-3, t-4, 
and t-5 as well. 
TABLE 2: Logistic regression of PTA ratification on human rights treaty ratification with standard errors 
clustered by country. The sample is limited to dyads where one partner has already ratified the human 
rights agreement but the other has not. The unit of observation is the (non-)ratification episode dyad, with 
ratification occurring in year t, all covariates measured in t-1, and most time-varying covariates measured 
in the years t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4, and t-5. The outcome variable is ratification of a PTA in years t through t+5. 
* indicates p < .05. 
 
As with aid, this lack of evidence for rewards is robust to a variety of possible specifications. But 
should we reject the null?  To answer this question, we decided a priori that a one percentage point 
increase in the probability of a BIT over 6 years was a minimum meaningful effect. At this level, we can 
confidently conclude that there are no BIT signing rewards for the ICCPR, Optional Protocol 1, or the 
CAT, but we are unable to rule out a reward for ratifying Article 22 (although we still find no evidence 
for a reward). 19 
 
 
Outcome Variable  Bilateral Investment Treaty ratification 
    Model 9    Model 10    Model 11    Model 12 
Treaty    ICCPR      OP 1      CAT     Art. 22 
Effect of Ratification 
(Clustered standard error) 
[90% confidence interval] 
    -1.37* 
    (0.25) 
[-1.79, -0.95] 
   -0.78* 
   (0.26) 
[-1.21, -0.35] 
   -0.13 
   (0.19) 
[-0.45, 0.19] 
   1.02  
  (0.53) 
[0.14, 1.91] 
         
N treated dyads   1,948   1,255   2,034    400 
N non-treated dyads   1,948   1,255   2,034    400 
Years  1982-2007  1982-2007  1986-2007  1986-2007 
Matching    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Controls   Physical integrity rights, BITs among export competitors, host extractive 
industries
†, host corruption
†, host legal tradition
†, BITs among the same 
religion, “learning from success,” coercion (Use of IMF credits), host 
GDP (logged)
†, host GDP/capita
†, host GDP growth
†, host net FDI flows 
(% of GDP)
 †, host illiteracy rate, host capital account, host law and order, 
host regime type, host diplomatic representation, host privatization 
record, home net FDI outflows (% of GDP)
†, dyadic trade
†, common 
colonial heritage, common language, alliance, Cold War, number of BITs 
globally (by year). All variables are lagged one year. Variables indicated 
with 
† include the lags t-2, t-3, t-4, and t-5 as well. 
 
TABLE 3: Logistic regression of Bilateral Investment Treaty signing on treaty ratification with standard 
errors clustered by country. The unit of observation is the (non-)ratification episode, with ratification 
occurring in year t, all covariates measured in year t-1, and most time-varying covariates measured in the 
years t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4, and t-5. The sample is limited to dyads where the home country has ratified the 
relevant HRA. The outcome variable is whether the dyad signs a BIT in years t through t+5. * indicates p 
< .05. 
 
One possible explanation for the absence of rewards is that donors might target rewards to states 
where they expect inducements will be most effective. To be confident that this is not the case, we re-
estimated the models in Tables 1, 2, and 3 on subsets of dyads where rewards might be most likely and 
effective: alliance partners, European powers and their former colonies, the US relationships with Latin 
America countries, mid-and low-income countries (where economic rewards might matter more), and 
transitional, partly democratic countries as defined by Simmons (2009) because these might be most 
susceptible to external legitimation or domestic pressures from political or social mobilization. Aid 
rewards were not evident for any of these subsets. There are some subsets of the data in which we find an 20 
 
increased propensity to sign BITs following human rights treaty ratification (11 treaty-subset pairings out 
of 48), but there is no consistency across either the treaties or the subsets (see the supplemental 
information). There is no smoking gun in this subset analysis indicating that material rewards 
Bringing these models together, evidence to support the continued assertion in the literature and 
popular press that human rights treaty ratification is the result of widespread tangible sticks and carrots 
from other countries is underwhelming. Moreover, additional tests for the proposition that human rights 
treaty ratification actually do increase trade or investment received absolutely no support.
15 If tangible 
rewards for ratification exist, they do not seem to be operating through the most likely channels.  
 
Intangible Rewards 
We now turn to evidence of the widespread use of praise, acceptance, and reduced criticism as 
intangible rewards to encourage ratification. We find isolated instances of intangible rewards in 
statements by the European Union praising the accession of states to human rights treaties. For example, a 
2005 EU press release on the occasion of the eighth United Nations International Day in Support of 
Victims of Torture, mentions that the 
EU welcomes the ratification of UNCAT during the course of the last year by Liberia, 
Mauritania and the Syrian Arab Republic; and the ratification of OPCAT by Argentina, 
Croatia, Liberia, Mali and Mexico.
16 
 
Similar statements were made on the anniversary of this event in 2007 and 2009, recognizing in total 
three CAT ratifications and twenty-one ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the CAT in similar 
summary fashion. 
A very small number of countries receive more individualized and specific praise.  On February 
16, 2009, the EU issued a press release which states: 
The EU welcomes Azerbaijan's ratification of the Optional Protocol to the UN 
Convention against Torture…on 28 January 2009.  The EU encourages Azerbaijan to 
                                                 
15 Results available in the Supplemental Information, with more available from authors upon request.  
16http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PESC/05/62&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en  Brief number: 2005-0062PESC. 21 
 
take early steps towards implementing its obligations under the Optional Protocol by 
establishing a National Preventative Mechanism and cooperating with the Subcommittee 
on Prevention.
17 
 
How common are such statements? We searched the 34,335 EU press releases to identify all 
examples of praise – defined as a statement displaying positive sentiment by the EU in specific reference 
to the ratification, accession, or implementation of an international human rights agreement (not limited to 
the four we focus on) by a specific country.
18 To our knowledge, no research to date makes systematic use 
of such a comprehensive database reflecting issues of importance to the EU. We found only 16 examples 
of praise-for-ratification: 11 praising ratification by a particular state and five noting ratifications in serial 
fashion as part of a larger press release.
19  
Notably, although we did not specifically look for cases of criticism during our manual coding, 
we found 31 briefings that criticized states specifically for violating the terms of their international 
commitments to human rights agreements. For example, a 2009 briefing stated that 
The European Union condemns the recent executions by stoning in Al Shabab-controlled 
areas of Somalia, including of a woman accused of adultery…. The European Union also 
calls on all relevant parties to ensure that the practice of execution by stoning is 
effectively and permanently terminated in the country, in conformity with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Convention against 
Torture…both of which Somalia has acceded to.
20 
An entire subgroup of briefings is dedicated to condemning Iran’s enforcement of the death penalty for 
crimes by minors in contravention of its international legal commitments. 
We conclude that praise-for-ratification does exist in the official communications of the European 
Union and this praise might offer a plausible explanation for specific instances of treaty ratification. 
                                                 
17 “Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the ratification of the OPCAT by Azerbaijan,” 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PESC/09/21&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&gu
iLanguage=en  Brief number: 2009-0021PESC. 
18 We first identified praise by searching for the names of human rights agreements using the search function on the 
EU website.  We then used these briefings to train a naïve Bayes text classifier (Hastie, et al. 2009) to identify 
further examples of praise. From these results, we hand-coded the top 100 candidate texts and used the new list to 
retrain a new classifier. After three iterations, we had identified all examples of praise in the corpus.  
19 We found additional examples of praise that did not meet our definition of praise-for-ratification, including praise 
for countries that abolished the death penalty (but without reference to the OPCAT), or recognition of countries that 
improved their human rights practices in some way (but without reference to a specific agreement).  
20 “Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on executions by stoning in Somalia” 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PESC-09-129_en.htm (Accessed 21 March 2014.) 22 
 
However, praise-for-ratification cannot be a general solution to the puzzle of treaty ratification because 
large waves of ratification precede any significant evidence of praise by Europe.
21 Ratification is also a 
two-edge sword: the EU often cites treaty obligations when criticizing states that violate human rights. 
To broaden the analysis, we examine the EU press releases for evidence of increased positive 
sentiment toward ratifying countries. We measure the context in which ratifying countries are mentioned 
by identifying the ten words immediately surrounding each direct reference to a specific country during 
years immediately preceding and following ratification. We then compare these words to a sentiment 
dictionary coding whether 8,221 terms evoke something positive, negative, or neutral sentiment (Wilson, 
Wiebe, and Hoffmann 2005). If ratifying countries are subtly praised, we might expect countries to be 
mentioned in contexts with more positive connotations in the year following ratification. We find no 
evidence that this is the case for any of the four treaties we examine. Countries that ratify an agreement 
experience about the same levels of positive and negative affect before and after ratification.  
Finally, we consider whether ratifying states are more accepted into the community of states by 
testing whether diplomatic visits from EU countries increase following ratification. We identified uses of 
the word “visit” in the ten words surrounding a specific mention of a particular country and then tested 
whether countries were more likely to receive visits in the year following ratification than the previous 
year.
22 We find no evidence that ratifying states enjoy more diplomatic visits after ratification. 
Although we think praise-for-ratification is most likely from the European Union, we also test 
whether the United States praises countries that ratify human rights agreements. Examining the 3,625 
daily press briefings of the Department of State between January 2, 1991 and December 23, 2008, we find 
that the United States seems to completely ignore ratification of human rights agreements. After failing to 
find any praise using automated methods, we individually read the 151 briefings that mention a specific 
                                                 
21 We find two examples of EU praise in the 1990s, three examples from 2000-2008, and six examples in 2009 and 
2010. 
22 This method is crude but accurate: virtually all discussions of an official visit use the word “visit” in the context of 
the name of the visited country. To test whether “visit” could refer to actions besides official visits, we randomly 
sampled and coded 100 instances of the word “visit” and found that 95 percent of instances referred to some sort of 
official visit. This suggests that our measure is a reasonable proxy for the number of official visits to a particular 
country from the EU members. 23 
 
country in the two-week period surrounding its ratification of one of the four treaties in our study. The 
results are stark – none of the briefings make any explicit mention of treaty ratification. The only implicit 
acknowledgment of a treaty ratification is a negative reference to Cuba’s ratification of the CAT which 
the United States criticizes as “the Cuban Government…attempting to project an image of greater 
openness and willingness to cooperate with the international community on human rights” while 
simultaneously cracking down on human rights activists.
23 
This lack of praise is striking because the United States routinely praises and criticizes other 
actions and statements of foreign countries in its press briefings. For example, a briefing on March 11, 
2002 approves of Mexican efforts to stop drug trafficking, but Mexican accession to the ICCPR Optional 
Protocol 1 just four days later goes unnoticed. The silence on treaty ratification is not attributable to the 
unwillingness of the State Department to mention international law. On the 24
th of July, 1991, the State 
Department briefing mentions in that Venezuela is party to “the 1988 U.N. convention against drug 
trafficking,” in connection with a discussion of narcotics trafficking in Latin America, but subsequent 
briefings fail to mention that just five days later, Venezuela acceded to the CAT.  
As with the European Union, we also tested whether countries that ratified human rights 
agreements were discussed in more positive terms or received more diplomatic visits in the year 
following their ratification and found that there were no significant differences before and after 
ratification.  
Finally, we turn to the possibility that countries ratify to reduce criticism from nonstate actors 
such as human rights NGOs. To test this, we use data from Ron et al. (2005) coding the number of news 
releases and background reports issued by Amnesty International criticizing a country’s human rights 
performance. We adopt the negative binomial model used by Ron et al. with the addition of two 
indicators for ratification of a treaty in the current year or the previous year. As with tangible rewards, we 
test for praise of each treaty separately although the results remain the same if we include indicators for 
all four treaties in the same model. Table 4 shows the regression results with the coefficients for the 
                                                 
23  State Department Daily Press Briefing, May 23, 2009. Accessed 2009. 24 
 
control variables omitted. We find no evidence that treaty ratification mutes criticism from Amnesty 
International. All of the coefficients are small and statistically insignificant at conventional levels and 
many of them are positive, suggesting that ratification does not reduce criticism.  
 
Outcome variable  Combined AI news releases and background reports 
    Model 1    Model 2    Model 3    Model 4 
Treaty    ICCPR      OP 1      CAT     Art. 22 
Ratification 
 
    0.022 
   (0.10) 
[-0.14, 0.19] 
   -0.18 
   (0.13) 
[-0.39, 0.03] 
    0.11 
   (0.08) 
[-0.02, 0.24] 
    0.098 
   (0.13) 
[-0.12, 0.31] 
Ratificationt-1     -0.008 
   (0.10) 
[-0.17, 0.16] 
   -0.065 
   (0.12) 
[-0.26, 0.13] 
    0.033 
   (0.076) 
[-1.22, 1.28] 
    0.19 
   (0.12) 
[-0.007, 0.39] 
         
N   1,828  1,828  1,828  1,828 
N of countries     150      150     150     150 
Random effects?     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
Controls   Political terror scale, Polity IV scores, presence of armed conflict, percent 
of population directly killed in armed conflict, GDP, military personnel, 
population, US military aid, foreign aid (ODA), and average media 
coverage. See Ron et al. (2005) for details. 
 
TABLE 4: Negative binomial regression of the number of Amnesty International news releases on 
background reports, regressed on treaty ratification and a set of controls with country random effects. 
90% confidence interval in parentheses.  
 
V. Conclusion: Understanding Ratification without International Rewards 
The legal regime for international human rights has been one of the three main pillars of 
international order for the past half century. Alongside the Security Council dedicated to peace and 
security and the GATT/WTO dedicated to trade liberalization, the complex of international human rights 
treaties has become even more crucial in the post-Cold War period (Simmons 2009). Given current 
concerns about the future of this order, it is imperative that we understand the causes of its expansion, 
stability, and potential transformation. 25 
 
In this article, we have called into question a widespread account of why states join some of the 
most important agreements in the human-rights regime. Our evidence is inconsistent with the contention 
that states have been induced to join such normatively important pacts as the ICCPR and the CAT out of a 
desire from external rewards from a core of wealthy, democratic countries. Our findings significantly 
undermine claims that states ratify human rights treaties in hopes of attracting tangible rewards—in the 
form of international aid, trade agreements, and foreign direct investment agreements—or intangible 
rewards—such as praise and acceptance into the club of “responsible” countries.  
We find practically no support for the idea that treaty ratification produces significant increases in 
aid. Furthermore, qualitative inquiries suggest that treaty ratification is unrelated to aid policies and 
programs in those wealthy, democratic countries most likely to have rewarded such behavior. We find 
that, in general, states do not use trade agreements and bilateral investment agreements as rewards for 
treaty ratification—although we did find a slight uptick in the likelihood of a preferential trade agreement 
in the year following ratification of the ICCPR and Article 22 of the CAT. But it is important to put these 
findings in perspective. The strongest possible claim that can be supported in favor of tangible rewards 
theory is that ratifying the ICCPR and Article 22—two of the most salient human rights agreements in 
existence—increases the probability of signing a PTA with an existing signatory in the six years 
following their ratification by 2.5 percentage points and 2.6 percentage points respectively. Given such a 
small chance of a benefit, it seems rather unlikely that states ratify these human-rights agreements in 
order to secure PTAs, let alone the range of treaties from children’s rights to the rights of the disabled. 
Moreover, supplementary tests show that trade and investment flows do not increase to states after 
ratification. The link between human rights treaty ratification and actual tangible rewards is, at the very 
best, extraordinarily tenuous. 
Nor is there much evidence that states regularly receive intangible rewards for human rights 
treaty ratification. Resulting praise from the EU is weak at best. The US State Department utterly ignores 
treaty ratification in its public statements. These findings might not surprise those who view the United 
States as largely aloof from the international legal regime for human rights (Ignatieff 2001), but they 26 
 
stand in stark contrast to theories of ratification that emphasize social acceptance as the major driver for 
treaty participation. Not even the major human rights non-governmental organization, Amnesty 
International, offers much in the way of praise when states ratify human rights treaties. The idea that 
acceptance into a circle of modern statehood can explain ratification also receives no support from 
patterns of state visits. States visits constitute one of the most important (and visible) displays of peer 
acceptance. But their frequency is unaffected by treaty ratification.  
These null findings are of significant theoretical importance. Scholars often portray participation 
in the global human rights regime by states outside of the European and North American “core” as largely 
externally induced. This may be the natural result of a research agenda driven by scholars from “core” 
countries, or it may reflect a general lack of research and knowledge about how nonwestern countries 
think about international law. The fairly widespread myth of rewards for human rights treaty ratification 
may also result from the bias in favor of publishing only positive results and ignoring null findings—even 
when these cast doubt on oft repeated but untested explanations for puzzling outcomes (Laitin 2013:46). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a full theory of treaty ratification, but we would 
point to several approaches that we think deserve more careful empirical attention. Moravscik (2000), for 
example, has pioneered one of the most compelling arguments for states to ratify treaties—and especially 
European conventions with teeth. He argues that they are useful for domestic political objectives; they 
help sustain democratic momentum and lock in fairly recent rights gains. While broader support for the 
lock-in thesis is not especially strong (Cole 2005), we do think that domestic considerations likely 
provide better explanations for why governments commit to international human rights treaties than ones 
that stress international factors. The “spiral model” developed by constructivists Risse and Sikkink (1999) 
conceives of ratification as a tactical concession to rights proponents at both the domestic and 
international levels. Simmons (2009:88) finds some evidence that governments in autocratic states have 
tended to ratify the ICCPR late in their office-holding, which seems to imply short term domestic reasons 
for ratification, as Pinochet’s decision to ratify the CAT within months of the first democratic election of 
his tenure suggests. Some rationalists, such as Vreeland (2008), argue that governments sometimes see 27 
 
ratification as a small concession to their domestic political opponents, while others, such as Hollyer and 
Rosendorff (2011), think regimes ratify treaties as a signal to domestic opponents that they are willing to 
torture them in spite of such commitments.  
Finally, these null findings are important for understanding how liberal international order has 
been maintained over the past few decades.  There is simply no evidence that formal state commitments 
to international human rights have been bought and paid for.  The international human rights regime does 
not rely systematically on outside material bribery, or even on overt forms of external approval.  These 
externally-oriented explanations have attracted far more attention than they deserve. We think a much 
closer look at the strategies and tactics governments employ domestically to keep a grip on their rule will 
provide much more purchase on the politics of human rights treaty ratification. 
 28 
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